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Abstract
This article analyzes the interaction and clashes of  the concept of  nationa-
lity and the concept of  diplomatic protection under international law as it 
may apply to individuals caught in international disputes between states of  
which they are nationals. The objective of  this analytical article is to examine 
this problem through the lens of  the figures of  Consular Assistance and 
Diplomatic Protection. Regarding the methodology, the article is descripti-
ve- analytical and uses legal comparative methodology, since it analyzes both 
law, treaties and jurisprudence from national and international sources. The 
article uses case-law analysis and is elaborated within the following structu-
re. Part 1 will deal with the general concept of  nationality at international 
law. Part 2 will examine “Consular Assistance”, its source, function and ap-
plication. Part 3 will examine a separate and distinct facet of  internatio-
nal law called “Diplomatic Protection” (as distinguished from “Diplomatic 
Immunity”) and its application to the protection of  nationals as well as its 
weaknesses. Part 4, which develops the original value and final goal of  this 
contribution, consist of  an analysis of  these particular protective measures 
within the context of  particular cases so as to illustrate the weaknesses of  
these figures as protective of  individuals, the limits of  nationality as a shield 
for individuals caught up in international disputes and the almost “second-
class” nature of  dual nationality from an international law perspective. Part 
5 as a conclusion will include some observations as to how states may im-
prove the protection they can afford to their nationals abroad.
Keywords: Nationality. Diplomatic protection. Dual national. Globaliza-
tion. Citizenship. International dispute resolution.
Resumo
Este artigo analisa a interação e os choques entre o conceito de nacionalida-
de e o conceito de proteção diplomática no âmbito do direito internacional, 
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conforme pode ser aplicado a indivíduos envolvidos em 
disputas internacionais entre Estados dos quais são na-
cionais. O objetivo deste artigo analítico é examinar esse 
problema sob a ótica das figuras da Assistência Con-
sular e da Proteção Diplomática. Quanto à metodolo-
gia, o artigo é descritivo-analítico e utiliza metodologia 
jurídica comparativa, uma vez que analisa legislações, 
tratados e jurisprudências de fontes nacionais e inter-
nacionais. O artigo utiliza a análise da jurisprudência e 
é elaborado dentro da seguinte estrutura. A Parte 1 tra-
tará do conceito geral de nacionalidade no direito inter-
nacional. A Parte 2 examinará “Assistência Consular”, 
sua fonte, função e aplicação. A Parte 3 examinará uma 
faceta separada e distinta do direito internacional cha-
mada “Proteção Diplomática” (distinta de “Imunidade 
Diplomática”) e sua aplicação à proteção de nacionais, 
bem como suas fraquezas. A Parte 4, que desenvolve o 
valor original e o objetivo final desta contribuição, con-
siste em uma análise dessas medidas de proteção par-
ticulares no contexto de casos particulares, de modo a 
ilustrar as fraquezas dessas figuras como protetoras de 
indivíduos, os limites da nacionalidade como um escudo 
para indivíduos envolvidos em disputas internacionais e 
a natureza quase de “segunda classe” da dupla nacionali-
dade de uma perspectiva de direito internacional. Como 
conclusão, a Parte 5 incluirá algumas observações sobre 
como os estados podem melhorar as proteções que po-
dem oferecer aos seus nacionais no exterior.
Palavras-chave: Nacionalidade. Proteção diplomática. 
Dupla nacionalidade. Globalização. Cidadania. Resolu-
ção de disputa internacional
1 Introduction
Recent cases show the challenges that new trends in 
dual nationality pose to consular assistance and diplo-
matic protection, once believed as settled institutions 
in international law. On 1 December 2018 officers of  
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Canadian 
Border Services Agency arrested Ms. Meng Wanzhou, 
a Chinese national and Chief  Financial Officer of  the 
Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei as she de-
planed at Vancouver International Airport1. The arrest 
1  ASSOCIATED PRESS. Huawei: Meng Wanzhou sues 
Canadian government over arrest. The Guardian, 04 Mar. 2019. Dis-
ponível em: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/04/
huawei-meng-wanzhou-sues-canadian-government-over-arrest. 
was in execution of  a British Columbia Supreme Court 
warrant issued following an extradition request from 
the United States. Extradition was requested in relation 
to various financial and money laundering charges ari-
sing from alleged violations of  sanctions against Iran. 
Though arrests and extraditions are normally quiet and 
routine, this one gained immediate attention due to Ms. 
Weng’s prominence in China2 and the forceful actions 
taken by China in response. Apart from demanding 
the immediate release of  Ms. Weng, the People’s Re-
public of  China, on 10 December 2018, arrested two 
Canadians working in China. One, Michael Kovrig is a 
former Canadian diplomat who, at the time of  his ar-
rest, was in China working with the International Crisis 
Group. The other, Michael Spavor was a businessman 
reportedly working to increase Canadian-North Korean 
business and cultural ties. Both were arrested for “en-
dangering national security”3 and as of  16 May 2019 
news was released that they had both been charged 
formally with stealing state secrets and passing them to 
foreign forces.4 Accordingly, China has ratcheted up its 
pressure against Canada in the Meng extradition case.
On 14 January 2019 China upped the ante by brin-
ging another Canadian, Robert Schellenberg, before a 
court for a sudden retrial. Schellenberg, who had been 
in custody since 2016, had previously been sentenced to 
15 years in custody on drug charges. On re-sentencing, 
he was sentenced to death.5
Kovrig, Spavor and Schellenberg are not the first 
Canadians to have been caught up in international 
disputes between China and Canada, or its allies. Ca-
Acesso em: 2 abr. 2019.
2  The Toronto Star. Disponível em: https://www.thestar.
com/vancouver/2019/03/08/why-is-huaweis-meng-wanzhou-
such-a-big-deal-shes-treated-like-a-princeling-in-china.html. Acesso 
em: 2 abr. 2019.
3  CANADIANS and Chinese justice: a who’s who of  the 
political feud so far. The Globe and Mail, Toronto, 15 Jan. 2019 Dis-
ponível em: https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-ca-
nadians-detained-china-huawei-explainer/. Acesso em: 2 abr. 2019.
4  CHINA accuses Canadians of  espionage. The Wash-




term=.7d4292101bd3. Acesso em: 17 May 2019.
5  ASSOCIATED PRESS. Chinese court sentences Ca-
nadian man to death in drug smuggling case. The Toronto Star, 
14 Jan. 2019. Disponível em: https://www.thestar.com/news/
canada/2019/01/14/a-chinese-court-has-sentenced-a-canadian-













































































































































nadians Kevin and Julia Garratt were detained in 2014 
in relation to a similar extradition dispute (with Kevin 
Garratt eventually spending 19 months in custody). As 
Canadian nationals Kovrig and Spavor are entitled to 
consular assistance but, although it has been techni-
cally permitted, it has been greatly limited6. Even their 
limited consular assistance stands in stark contrast to 
the case of  Huseyin Celil (detailed below) a Uighur of  
Chinese birth but a nationalized Canadian. His situation 
illustrates another serious issue…that of  the limitation 
of  rights recognized under international law in Cases 
involving dual nationals.
Another issue raised by Canada in the case of  Mr. 
Kovrig has to do with the issue Diplomatic Immunity 
but this is beyond the scope of  this paper.7
As seen in the case of  Zahra Kazemi, an Iranian-
-born naturalized Canadian citizen8 who, at the age of  
54 years, died while in custody in Iran not all cases in-
volve China. She was a photojournalist and had traveled 
to Iran in Spring 2003 to cover student riots happening 
at the time. Iranian authorities arrested her on 23 June 
2003 for taking photos outside a prison in Teheran. She 
died in custody on 11 July 2003.9 Iranian Vice Presi-
dent Mohammad Ali Abhati acknowledged on 16 July 
2003 that, despite earlier representations by the Iranian 
authorities that she had suffered a stroke, she had in 
fact died from being beaten.10 Iran does not recognize 
6  Then Canadian Ambassador to China, John McCallum 
informed the Canadian House of  Commons on 18 January 2019 
that the men, whose whereabouts are unknown, were only allowed 
consular visits of  one-half  hour once per month. The Globe and 
Mail (Toronto) Op cit Note 4. This stands in stark contrast to the 
treatment of  Ms. Weng under the Canadian justice system in which 
she has had access to a team of  lawyers, has been released on bail 
(with electronic monitoring) and resides in what has been reported 
to be one of  her Vancouver mansions.
7  Though he was not an accredited diplomat at the time of  
his arrest, Mr. Kovrig was previously a Canadian diplomat posted 
to China. Canada has alleged that Mr. Kovrig has been subjected to 
Chinese interrogation about his duties and actions during his previ-
ous period as a diplomat which conduct, says Canada, violates the 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. ZIMONJIC, Peter. 
Trudeau accuses China of  violating diplomatic immunity in arrest 
of  Michael Kovrig. CBC News, 11 Jan. 2019. Disponível em: https://
www.cbc.ca/news/politics/trudeau-diplomatic-immunity-michael-
kovrig-1.4975759. Acesso em: 2 abr. 2019.
8  She also held French nationality.
9 For a full description of  the facts of  Ms. Karemi’s death please 
refer to the decision of  the Quebec Court of  Appeal in Islamic Re-
public of  Iran v. Hashemi 12 Aug. 2012, QCCA 1449. p. 3-5.
10 LIGABO, Ambeyi. Special Rapporteur. U.N. High Commission 
on Human Rights on the Right to Freedom of  Opinion and Expres-
sion. Report on Mission to the Islamic Republic of  Iran. 12 Jan. 2004 U.N. 
dual nationality and accordingly throughout the pro-
cess, Iran took the position that it did not recognize 
Ms. Kazemi’s Canadian nationality and refused to allow 
Canadian involvement in any investigations, or judicial 
proceedings in relation to this event. This extended to 
the refusal to allow the repatriation to Canada of  her 
remains for burial.11
These situations and others illustrate that the globa-
lization of  today’s world means that international dispu-
tes and “power politics”, once thought to be the rarified 
subject matter of  spats between diplomats arguing over 
cognac and cigars, can have significant impact on indi-
viduals. In such cases, having a nationality is important 
because it implicitly means having a state that is able to 
come to such a person’s assistance if  required12. Every 
diplomatic mission includes a consular mission whose 
function is to assist nationals in foreign countries. States 
that do not have embassies in particular countries gene-
rally name embassies from other states to whom their 
nationals may attend if  assistance is needed.
This article is about the interaction of  nationality 
and international law as it may apply to individuals cau-
ght in international disputes between states of  which 
they are nationals. The article will examine this problem 
through the lens of  the figures of  Diplomatic Protec-
tion and Consular Assistance. The paper will be develo-
ped within the following structure. Part 1 will deal with 
the general concept of  nationality at international law. 
Part 2 will examine “Diplomatic Protection”. Part 3 will 
examine a separate and distinct facet of  international 
law called Consular Assistance”, its source, function 
and application the protection of  nationals as well as 
its weaknesses. Part 4 will consist of  an analysis of  the-
se particular protective measures within the context of  
particular cases to illustrate the limitations of  these fi-
gures as protective of  individuals, the limits of  nationa-
lity as a shield for individuals caught up in international 
disputes and the almost “second-class” nature of  dual 
nationality from an international law perspective. Part 
5 as a conclusion will include some observations as to 
how states may improve the protections they can afford 
to their nationals abroad.
Doc. E/CN.4/62/Add 2, para. 74.
11 Or, as may have been a greater concern from the Iranian per-
spective, for autopsy.
12 See MCGARVEY-ROSENDAHL, Patricia. A new approach to 












































































































































2  The concept of nationality under 
the international law rules on 
diplomatic protection
To have a nationality is considered so important 
under international law that multiple international law 
instruments characterize it as a “right” or something 
similar. For example, international law has multiple 
examples of  efforts to eliminate the phenomenon of  
“statelessness” including the preamble to the Hague 
Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Con-
flict of  Nationality Laws13 (herein Hague Nationality 
Convention) of  1930 which provided:
BEING CONVINCED that it is in the 
general interest of  the international community 
to secure that all its members should recognise 
that every person should have a nationality 
and should have one nationality only;
RECOGNISING accordingly that the ideal 
towards which the efforts of  humanity should 
be directed in this domain is the abolition of  
all cases both of  statelessness and of  double 
nationality14;
In 1961, the preamble to the Convention on the 
Reduction of  Statelessness (CRS)15 stated it is “[…] 
desirable to reduce statelessness by international agree-
ment”16. Although the CRS provides conditions under 
which States must grant nationality, and, subject to cer-
tain conditions, prohibits states from revoking nation-
ality when it would render an individual “stateless”17, it 
does not contain a general “right” to a nationality. The 
Universal Declaration of  Human Rights18, however, 
does contain a “right” to a nationality, as follows:
Article 15.
(1) Everyone has the right to a nationality.
(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of  his 
13 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Con-
flict of  Nationality Laws, 1930.
14 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Con-
flict of  Nationality Laws, 1930. Preamble.
15 UNITED NATIONS. Convention on the reduction of  state-
lessness. Treaty Series, v. 989, p. 175. Entered into force 13 Dec. 1975. 
5 signatories, 40 parties.
16 UNITED NATIONS. Convention on the reduction of  state-
lessness. Treaty Series, v. 989, p. 175. Entered into force 13 Dec. 1975. 
5 signatories, 40 parties. Preamble.
17 UNITED NATIONS. Convention on the reduction of  state-
lessness. Treaty Series, v. 989, p. 175. Entered into force 13 Dec. 1975. 
5 signatories, 40 parties. Art 8.1.
18 GA Res. 217A (III) 10 Dec. 1948.
nationality nor denied the right to change his 
nationality.19
The International Law Commission, in its Draft Ar-
ticles on Nationality of  Natural Persons in Relation to 
the Succession of  States20 included a “Right to Nation-
ality” in Article 1, which would arise in the context of  
state succession. It provides as follows:
Article 1. Right to a Nationality
Every individual who, on the date of  the 
succession of  States, had the nationality of  the 
predecessor State, irrespective of  the mode 
of  acquisition of  that nationality, has the right 
to the nationality of  at least one of  the States 
concerned, in accordance with the present 
draft articles.21
Though the United Nations General Assembly has 
not yet adopted these Draft Articles, they illustrate an 
evolution in the perception of  the individual under in-
ternational law. Given that they emanate from eminent 
“publicists” of  international law, they carry special wei-
ght. They reflect an evolution of  a concept of  natio-
nality from something within the sovereign right of  a 
State22 to confer into something that exists as the right 
of  an individual.
Two other additional instruments containing no-
teworthy recognitions of  this “right” are the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 23, which 
provides in Article 24 (3) that “Every child has the right 
to acquire a nationality”24 and the European Conven-
tion on Nationality25 provides that “[…] everyone has 
the right to a nationality.”26
19 GA Res. 217A (III) 10 Dec. 1948. Art 15.
20 DRAFT Articles on Nationality of  Natural Persons in Relation 
to the Succession of  States with Commentaries. Yearbook of  the Inter-
national Law Commission, v. 2, part 2, 1999.
21 DRAFT Articles on Nationality of  Natural Persons in Relation 
to the Succession of  States with Commentaries. Yearbook of  the Inter-
national Law Commission, v. 2, part 2, 1999. Art. 1.
22 For an analysis of  the challenges of  Brazilian domestic laws 
on nationality, please see: NUNES, Paulo Henrique Faria. Nacion-
alidade: novas regras, velhos problemas. Revista de Direito Internac-
ional, Brasilia, v. 16, n. 2, p. 225-242, 2019. DOI: http://dx.doi.
org/10.5102/rdi.v16i2.5970
23 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA Res 
2200A (XXI).
24 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA Res 
2200A (XXI). Art 24 (3).
25 Supra note 14.
26 Supra note 14. Para 4 (a). Art. 4 (c) provides that “[…] no one 
shall be arbitrarily deprived of  his or her nationality.” While this is a 
European Convention, it is clear from the Explanatory Report that 












































































































































With a nationality comes the expectation and even 
the right to have the state extend its protections over its 
citizens, even when abroad. It is perplexing therefore, 
that international law, which, on the one hand recogni-
zes so firmly the right to acquire a nationality, should, 
on the other, treat dual nationality as a sort of  second-
-class category.
As regards dual nationals, the role of  the state beco-
mes more complicated at the international level. Thou-
gh migration of  peoples is a historical phenomenon, 
globalization has led to more and more people acqui-
ring dual (or more) nationalities because of  birth in one 
country and living and/or working in another. Children, 
as well, can acquire dual nationalities on birth because 
of  having parents of  different nationalities, depending 
upon the laws of  their place of  birth.
People acquiring a second nationality reasonably 
expect that they will have the rights and benefits that 
run with being a citizen of  the new state. But gaps in 
international law make it appear that a second nationa-
lity is, in some ways “second-class” for the purposes of  
international law. When disputes arise between states, 
individuals having nationalities in both states can find 
themselves caught in the middle. It is at this moment 
that these “gaps” can manifest themselves. As will be 
discussed below, some specific current cases provide 
powerful examples of  this problem27.
Both the remedy of  Diplomatic Protection and the ri-
ght to consular assistance are framed through reference to 
nationality. The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 
(VCCR) frames its application in terms of  nationality. It 
defines “consular functions” to include the protection in 
the “receiving state” of  the “[…] interests of  the sending 
state and its nationals […]”28 (emphasis added), and “[…] 
helping and assisting nationals, both individuals and cor-
porate, of  the sending State;”29 VCCR Article 36 permits 
consular assistance to be provided to “nationals”. But who 
is a national or, more precisely, who qualifies for recogni-
tion as a national for purposes of  the VCCR?
concerned, it seems, international law prohibits the arbitrary dep-
rivation of  an individual’s nationality. Article 7 of  the 1989 United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of  the Child contains a similar 
provision.
27 That said, there are significant limitations on what a protection 
a state may accord even a national by birth. Every state may exercise 
its sovereignty over visitors.
28 VCCR, supra note s Art. 5 (a).
29 VCCR, supra note s Art. 5 (a). Art 5 (e).
Though it is common to use the terms “citizenship” 
and “nationality” interchangeably, and indeed they 
mean substantially the same thing, this paper uses the 
term “nationality” throughout not only because it may 
be more “internationalist” in tone, but because it the 
term specifically used in the VCCR.30
While “nationality”, as a general term, may refer to 
connections between individuals with a common heri-
tage, Patricia McGarvey-Rosendahl notes that in “[…] 
international law […] nationality is narrowly defined 
and refers to the legal relationship between an indivi-
dual and a sovereign state.”31 She says:
Nationality is a reciprocal relationship, as the 
state gives its protection to the individual and the 
individual in turn gives his allegiance to the state.32
Just as nationality implies that one may expect that 
your state will protect you, states have an implicit right 
to determine to whom they will treat as a national for 
the purposes of  extending such protection. An incident 
of  sovereignty is the right to determine who is a natio-
nal of  the state. In the Nottebohm case, a Diploma-
tic Protection case, the International Court of  Justice 
(I.C.J.) commented:
[…] it is for every sovereign State, to settle by its 
own legislation the rules relating to the acquisition 
of  its nationality, and to confer that nationality 
by naturalization granted by its own organs in 
accordance with that legislation.33
Thus, as Peter J. Spiro writes, states have been, “[…] 
more or less unfettered in formulating their own stan-
dards for nationality […]”34
As the ICJ noted in Nottebohm, however, it is one 
30 RUBENSTEIN, Kim; ADLER, Daniel. International citizen-
ship: the future of  nationality in a globalized world. Ind. Global Legal 
Stud., v. 7, p. 519, 1999/2000. Another key difference is that the 
package of  rights enjoyed by “nationals” and “citizens” of  the same 
State may be different. For example, Mexico recognizes many Mexi-
cans living outside Mexico as “nationals”, but they may lack certain 
rights of  “citizens” such as voting or the right to own land.
31 MCGARVEY-ROSENDAHL, Patricia. A new approach to dual 
nationality. Hous. J. Int. L., v. 8, p. 305, 1985/1986.
32 MCGARVEY-ROSENDAHL, Patricia. A new approach to dual 
nationality. Hous. J. Int. L., v. 8, p. 305, 1985/1986.
33 Nottebohm Case (second phase), Judgment of  April 6th, 1955: 
I.C.J. Reports 1955, p.4 at p.20. See also Advisory Opinion No. 4, 
Tunis-Morocco Nationality Decrees 1923 P.C.I.J. (Ser. B) No. 4 at 
24 where it is stated that the issue of  nationality falls within the 
reserved domain of  domestic law.
34 SPIRO, Peter. Dual nationality and the meaning of  citizenship. 













































































































































thing for a state to recognize an individual as a national 
for the purposes of  its own domestic law, but a separate 
question as to whether that recognition extends to the 
international sphere. In Nottebohm, in which Liechten-
stein sought to assert diplomatic protection on behalf  
of  a naturalized subject, the court said that Liechten-
stein’s recognition of  Mr. Nottebohm as its national 
was not binding internationally. The court said:
It does not depend on the law or the decision 
of  Liechtenstein whether that state is entitled 
to exercise its protection, in the case under 
consideration. To exercise protection, to apply 
to the court, is to place oneself  on the plane 
of  international law. It is international law 
which determines whether a State is entitled 
to exercise protection and to seise the Court.
The naturalization of  Nottebohm was an act 
performed by Liechtenstein in the exercise 
of  its domestic jurisdiction. The question 
to be decided is whether that act has the 
international effect here under consideration.35
Thus, for international law purposes, the issue of  
nationality and its recognition is not determined solely 
by the domestic law of  the nationalizing state. Com-
pliance with international law may or may not be achie-
ved by mere compliance with domestic law.
The acquisition of  dual nationalities, and the asso-
ciated problems, arises from the conflict of  national 
laws regarding the granting of  nationality. In general, 
there are three means by which nationality may be ac-
quired: jus soli (an individual born within a State’s ter-
ritory becomes a citizen of  that state), jus sanguinis36 
(people automatically acquire the nationality of  one or 
both parents) and naturalization.37 Special Rapporteur 
Roberto Córdova, in his 1954 “Report on Dual Natio-
nality” noted: that, at that time,
The main source of  double nationality is…the 
conflict of  the principles by virtue of  which 
nationality is acquired at birth. If  jus soli were 
exclusively applied in every State of  the world, 
35 Nottebohm Case, supra note 11, at p. 20-21.
36 For an analysis on the reception of  the jus sanguinis criteria 
under international law, please review: PEREIRA, Hitala Mayara 
Pereira de Vasconcelos. Da nacionalidade como direito humano: da 
necessária ampliação das hipóteses de aplicação do critério do jus 
sanguinis nos casos de adoção internacional. Revista de Direito Inter-
nacional, Brasilia, v. 11, n. 2, p. 435-452, 2014/2015. DOI: http://
dx.doi.org/10.5102/rdi.v11i2.3035.
37 MCGARVEY-ROSENDAHL, Patricia. A new approach to dual 
nationality. Hous. J. Int. L., v. 8, p. 305, 1985/1986.
double nationality would never occur. Similarly, 
if  jus sanguinis were the only rule applied, a 
child would not acquire any other nationality 
than that of  his parents, the nationality of  the 
father prevailing.38
This phenomenon is greatly compounded today, 
over 65 years later, by the vast numbers of  people mi-
grating around the world, and the consequent increase 
in nationalizations. That said, however, the majority of  
states continue to not recognize dual nationality.39
More recently, new means to acquire nationality 
have been developed and regulated by States, reflecting 
modern economic needs such as the urgency to attract 
investors, to diversify the jurisdictions and instruments 
regarding the protection of  investments40, or to develop 
a particular national industry or market. For example, 
jus doni, also known as citizenship by investment, natio-
nality by investment or economic citizenship, has been 
adopted by many States around the globe (from the 
United States to Malta), including what some authors 
have criticized as “cash for passports” models that grant 
immediate naturalizations41 and don’t require residence 
or other classic requirements that made naturalization 
a long process before the local authorities, putting into 
risk the concept of  “genuine link”42 between the citizen 
and the State.
This phenomenon contributes to the expansion of  
of  dual nationality cases by providing individuals with 
a fast-track to a second nationality and in some occa-
sions, to rapidly acquiring more than one nationality by 
investment.
For international law purposes, the test of  nationali-
ty applied by the I.C.J. in the Nottebohm case was that 
of  “effective nationality”. In Part 3 we will examine the 
38 CÓRDOVA, Roberto. Report on Multiple Nationality. U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/83, para. 8.
39 In March 2001 the United States Office of  Personnel Man-
agement Investigations Service published a summary of  the then 
existing nationalization policies of  the world’s states. Of  the 188 
States listed, 131 failed to recognize dual nationality. See: http://
www.multiplecitizenship.com/documents/IS-01.pdf. Acesso em: 28 
nov. 2013.
40 AUDIT, Mathias. La coexistence de procédures contentieuses 
en matière d’investissements étrangers. Anuario Colombiano de Derecho 
Internacional (ACDI), v. 10, p. 333-370, 2017.
41 KÄLIN, Christian H. Key Contours of  Citizenship and Ius Doni: Ius 
Doni in International Law and EU Law. Brill Nijhoff, 2019. 17-58.
42 KRAKAT, Michael B. Genuine links beyond state and market 
control: the sale of  citizenship by investment in international and 












































































































































relevance of  this test to Article 36 of  the VCCR.
Until recently, the existence of  dual nationalities was 
considered at best an inconvenience and at worst an 
evil. In any event it was to be avoided and discouraged. 
Spiro writes:
Instances of  dual nationality are almost as old as the 
concept of  nationality itself, and the phenomenon has 
been deplored for just as long.43
Allegiance was viewed as “perpetual” as embodied 
in the legal maxim “Nemo potest exuere patriam”, 
meaning “no man may abjure his native country or the 
allegiance that he owes”.44 The British had a more suc-
cinct way of  capturing the idea, expressed in the saying: 
“Once an Englishman, always an Englishman”.45
The negative view of  dual nationality persisted until 
well into the 20th century. The 1930 Hague Convention 
on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of  Natio-
nality Laws (hereafter Hague Convention) includes in 
the opening averments:
BEING CONVINCED that it is in the general 
interest of  the international community to secure 
that all its members should recognize that every 
person should have a nationality and should have 
only one nationality:46 (emphasis added)
The Hague Convention accepted the “Doctrine of  
Non-Responsibility of  States for Claims of  Dual Na-
tionals” (the “doctrine of  non-responsibility”) which 
prohibited a State from affording diplomatic protection 
to a national against a State of  which the individual is 
also a national.47
43 SPIRO, Peter. Dual nationality and the meaning of  citizenship. 
Emory Law Journal, v. 46, p. 1411, 1997. supra note 12 at p 1417.
44 KETTNER, James. Subjects or Citizens? A Note on British 
Views Respecting the Legal Effects of  American Independence. Va. 
L. Rev, v. 62, n. 945, p. 947, 1976. at p. 947.
45 RUSSELL, Franklin. Dual nationality in practice-some bizarre 
results. Int’l Lawyer, v. 4, p. 756, 1969/1970. (hereinafter referred to 
as “RUSSELL”). One example of  “indelible nationality” was that, 
despite the United States achieving independence in 1783, United 
States nationals were considered until 1870 to be British nationals 
and therefore subject to such measures as conscription into the Brit-
ish Royal Navy. See RUSSELL at p. 756.
46 1939 Hague Convention.
47 1939 Hague Convention. Art. 4. It is worth noting that the Iran-
United States Claims Tribunal in its case A/18 questioned the con-
tinued efficacy of  this prohibition and cautioned great care in its 
interpretation. See Iran – United Status Claims Tribunal: Decision in 
Case A/18 Concerning the Question of  Jurisdiction Over Claims of  
Persons with Dual Nationality (1984), 23 Int’l Legal Materials 489 at 
page 497, and discussion in Part Three of  this paper below.
The Convention also dealt with the issues of  natio-
nality of  married women, children, adopted children 
and expatriation. Despite the foregoing, however, the 
Hague Convention had to recognize the right of  states 
to determine who their own nationals were48, and that a 
person with two or more nationalities could be regarded 
as its national by either of  the states involved.49
With regard to third states, however, it contained the 
following:
Within a third State, a person having more than one 
nationality shall be treated as if  he had only one. 
Without prejudice to the application of  its law in 
matters of  personal status and of  any conventions 
in force, a third State shall, of  the nationalities which 
any such person possesses, recognize exclusively 
in its territory either the nationality in which he is 
habitually and principally resident, or the nationality 
of  the country with which in the circumstances he 
appears to be in fact most closely connected.50
Thus, the Hague Convention, while seeking to achie-
ve a goal of  single nationalities for everyone, dealt with 
the dual nationalities problem by utilizing a form of  the 
“effective nationality” test later adopted by the I.C.J. in 
the Nottebohm case.
In his 1954 report to the International Law Com-
mission (ILC) entitled “Report on Multiple Nationali-
ty”, Special Rapporteur Roberto Córdova wrote:
The Special Rapporteur has already had the 
opportunity to state in his first report…that in the 
general interest of  the international community 
every person should have a nationality, but only one 
nationality, and that every effort should be made to 
avoid double or multiple nationality.51
He goes on to explain that multiple nationality is 
“[…] a constant source of  friction between States”52 
and illustrates the problem through examples such as 
the possibility of  multiple military service obligations 
and the complications that arise when States seek to 
grant diplomatic protection on behalf  of  dual natio-
nals.53 Mr. Córdova’s approach to resolving the multiple 
48 1939 Hague Convention. Art. 1.
49 1939 Hague Convention. Art. 3.
50 1939 Hague Convention. Art. 5.
51 CÓRDOVA, Roberto. Report on Multiple Nationality. U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/83, para. 8. supra, note 15, para. 5.
52 CÓRDOVA, Roberto. Report on Multiple Nationality. U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/83, para. 8. para 6.
53 As noted, one specific difficulty that arises in regards to dual na-
tionalities is the general rule that a State cannot exercise Diplomatic 
Protection on behalf  of  a national against a State of  which the indi-












































































































































nationalities problem involved deeming that individuals 
be deprived of  all but their “effective nationality”.54
Mr. Córdova then seeks to define “effective natio-
nality”.
To determine the effective nationality account will 
be taken of  the following circumstances, either 
jointly or separately:
a) Residence in the territory of  one of  the States 
of  which the individual concerned is a national;
b) In the case of  residence in the territory of  
a state of  which he is not a national, whether or 
not this State is a party, the previous and habitual 
residence in the territory of  one of  the States of  
which he is a national; 
c) If  the criteria mentioned in the above 
subparagraphs do not apply, any other circumstances 
showing a closer link de facto to one of  the states 
of  which he is a national, such as:
i) Military service;
ii) Exercise of  civil and political rights or of  
political office;
iii) Language;
iv) His previous request of  diplomatic protection 
from such State;
v) Ownership of  immovable property.55
Once again, “effective nationality” appears as the 
solution to the problem, in the international sphere, of  
dual nationality.
More recently, however, the issue of  “dual nationa-
lity” has been seen less as an evil to be eliminated and 
more as a complication to be accommodated. Much-
more writes:
By the mid-1950’s, however, international tribunals 
began to assert that, while an individual could validly 
have more than one nationality, only one of  those 
nationalities could be dominant and effective for 
purposes of  international law at any given time.56
In 1959, Zvonko R. Rode took the view that the rule 
of  “dominant nationality” (as he referred to effective 
nationality) was, in fact, the older rule, and that the doc-
trine of  non-responsibility of  states, which had arisen 
of  Non-Responsibility of  States for Claims of  Dual Nationals. See 
Rode, supra note 14 at p. 141.
54 CÓRDOVA, Roberto. Report on Multiple Nationality. U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/83, para. 8. Basis 2.
55 CÓRDOVA, Roberto. Report on Multiple Nationality. U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/83, para. 8. Basis 3.
56 MUCHMORE, Adam I. Passports and nationality in interna-
tional law. U.C. Davis J Int’l. L. and Pol’y, v. 301, p. 316, 2003/2004. 
at p. 316.
more recently was destined to fall into disuse.57
Spiro writes:
Recent years have witnessed a marked softening 
in state attitudes towards dual nationality. States 
now appear more willing to accept the retention 
of  nationality notwithstanding nationalization 
in a foreign state, at the same time as they have 
abandoned efforts to root out the underlying causes 
of  dual nationality.58
While an examination of  t he various modern attitu-
des towards dual nationality is beyond the scope of  this 
paper, we note that there are those who go so far as to 
posit that a dual nationality is a human right.59 Times 
have changed, but there are some states which resist 
these new views, with harsh consequences for indivi-
duals.
3  Diplomatic protection and its 
current issues under new challenges 
to the clasic rules on nationality in a 
globalized world
Diplomatic Protection is distinct from the separate 
figure of  Diplomatic Immunity and arises out of  the es-
sential sovereignty of  the state itself. It is founded upon 
the historic right of  states to act in protection of  their 
citizens60. Specifically, it is the right of  a state to pro-
tect its nationals being victimized illegally by a foreign 
state in which they happen to be present61. The right is 
that of  the state, not the victims, and arises out of  the 
concept that an offence against a state’s nationals is an 
offence against the state itself.
57 ZVONKO, R. Rode. Dual nationals and the doctrine of  domi-
nant nationality. A.J.I.L., v. 53, n. 1, p. 139, 1959. supra note 14 at 
p. 143.
58 SPIRO, Peter. Dual nationality and the meaning of  citizenship. 
Emory Law Journal, v. 46, p. 1411, 1997. supra note 12 at p. 1453.
59 See MCGARVEY-ROSENDAHL, Patricia. A new approach to 
dual nationality. Hous. J. Int. L., v. 8, p. 305, 1985/1986. In which the 
author compares holders of  earlier views of  dual nationality with 
those with more modern views based on the reality of  “[…] fin de 
siecle America in a shrinking globe […]” at p 2.
60 BROWNLIE, Ian. Principles of  public international law. 6. ed. Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2003. at p. 391, where BROWNLIE 
characterizes this proposition of  law as “trite”.
61 MACLEAN, R. J. Blaise. Fresh hay from old fields: the con-
tinuing usefulness of  diplomatic protection. In: GALVIS, Ricardo 
Abello (ed.). Derecho internacional contemporáneo: lo público, lo privado, 
los derechos humanos: liberr amicorum en homenaje a Germán 












































































































































An important jurisprudential starting point for the 
concept is provided by the Permanent Court of  Inter-
national Justice (PCIJ) in the Mavrommatis Palestine 
Concessions62 case:
It is an elementary principle of  international law 
that a State is entitled to protect its subjects when 
injured by acts contrary to international law by 
another State from whom they have been unable to 
obtain satisfaction through the ordinary channels. 
By taking up the case of  one of  its subjects and 
by resorting to diplomatic action or international 
judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in 
reality asserting its own right – its right to ensure, in 
the person of  its subjects, respect for the rules of  
international law.63
Prof. John Dugard (appointed in 2000 by the ILC 
as Special Rapporteur on Diplomat Protection64) while 
acknowledging the existence of  some underlying legal 
fictions, recognized the remaining importance of  diplo-
matic protection as a remedy available to a State.65 He 
identified a lack, at the international level, of  the exis-
tence of  substantive individual procedural rights, which 
led him to conclude that Diplomatic Protection as a re-
medy ought to be preserved:
Until the individual acquires comprehensive 
procedural rights under international law, it 
would be a setback for human rights to abandon 
diplomatic protection.66
Prof. Dugard seems to have been a goodforecaster: 
in March of  2019 the United Kingdom granted Diplo-
matic Protection to Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe an Ira-
nian-British national who has been imprisoned in Iran 
since April 2016 when she and her 22-month old dau-
62 Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, Greece v. United Kingdom, Objec-
tion to the Jurisdiction of  the Court, Judgment, PCIJ Series A n. 2, 
ICGJ 236 (PCIJ 1924), 30 Aug. 1924. Permanent Court of  Interna-
tional Justice.
63 Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, Greece v. United Kingdom, Objec-
tion to the Jurisdiction of  the Court, Judgment, PCIJ Series A n. 2, 
ICGJ 236 (PCIJ 1924), 30 Aug. 1924. Permanent Court of  Interna-
tional Justice. Supra, n.1
64 DUGARD, John R. First Report on Diplomatic Protection. UN Doc. 
A/CN. 4/506, 7 Mar. 2000. (hereinafter “First Report”) and pub-
lished in The Report of  the 52nd Session of  the International Law 
Commission (2000) U.N. Doc. A/55/10.
65 DUGARD, John R. First Report on Diplomatic Protection. UN Doc. 
A/CN. 4/506, 7 Mar. 2000. (hereinafter “First Report”) and pub-
lished in The Report of  the 52nd Session of  the International Law 
Commission (2000) U.N. Doc. A/55/10. Para 21.
66 DUGARD, John R. First Report on Diplomatic Protection. UN Doc. 
A/CN. 4/506, 7 Mar. 2000. (hereinafter “First Report”) and pub-
lished in The Report of  the 52nd Session of  the International Law 
Commission (2000) U.N. Doc. A/55/10. Para 29.
ghter were taken into custody.67 Ms. Zaghari-Ratcliffe 
received a five-year sentence for “spying”. Her now 
four-year-old daughter has been unable to return to the 
UK to join her father. Due to lack of  progress in nego-
tiating her release, and allegations of  mistreatment in 
prison by Iranian authorities, the UK has “…raise(d) 
her case from a consular matter to the level of  a dis-
pute between the two states.”68 The requirements for a 
successful claim of  Diplomatic Protection give rise to 
some of  the issues of  nationality, yet it is a matter of  
interest that the remedy remains alive as recommended 
by Dugard.69
As noted, when Diplomatic Protection is invoked 
it is a right of  the State that is being enforced. Victims 
have no in personam right to have diplomatic protection 
enforced on their behalf.70 Thus, it falls entirely within 
the discretion of  the State and its procedures to deter-
mine whether, it is appropriate to seek satisfaction ari-
sing from a wrong committed against its national. From 
the state’s perspective, of  course, this is the preferable 
position, as it allows the exercise its own discretion. 
Consequently, international law recognizes no human 
right to diplomatic protection.71
International law has established the following pa-
rameters in order to invoke a claim for diplomatic pro-
tection:
67 FOREIGN Office grants Zaghari-Ratcliffe diplomatic protec-
tion. The Guardian, Mar. 2019. Disponível em: https://www.the-
guardian.com/news/2019/mar/07/foreign-office-grants-nazanin-
zaghari-radcliffe-diplomatic-protection. Disponível em: 3 abr. 2019.
68 FOREIGN Office grants Zaghari-Ratcliffe diplomatic protec-
tion. The Guardian, Mar. 2019. Disponível em: https://www.the-
guardian.com/news/2019/mar/07/foreign-office-grants-nazanin-
zaghari-radcliffe-diplomatic-protection. Disponível em: 3 abr. 2019.
69 Of  note, the authors herein have posited the availability of  dip-
lomatic protection as a remedy available in regard to the mistreat-
ment by Venezuelans of  Colombians resident in that country. See: 
MACLEAN, Robert Joseph-Blaise; AREVALO, Walter. The expul-
sion of  resident colombian nationals during the Colombia-Venezue-
la border dispute: an under the radar: case for diplomatic protection 
of  human rights?. Vniversitas, v. 68, n. 138, 2019.
70 See, e.g. DUGARD, John R. First Report on Diplomatic Protection. 
UN Doc. A/CN. 4/506, 7 Mar. 2000. (hereinafter “First Report”) 
and published in The Report of  the 52nd Session of  the Interna-
tional Law Commission (2000) U.N. Doc. A/55/10. supra, n.3, para 
75 as to the traditional position, Barcelona Traction Light and Power 
Company Ltd, 1970 ICJ Reports 1 at p 44, and WARBRICK, Colin. 
Diplomatic representations and diplomatic protection. ICLQ, v. 51, 
p. 723, 2000. at p. 1008, in reference to the British Rules.
71 WARBRICK, Colin. Diplomatic representations and diplomatic 
protection. ICLQ, v. 51, p. 723, 2000. (hereinafter “Diplomatic Rep-
resentations”) at p. 731. This does not, of  course, preclude the right 












































































































































(a) the commission of  an “international wrong”, 
that is, act contrary to international law,72
(b) the international wrong must be attributable to 
a State,
(c) the international wrong must have been 
committed against a national of  another State73,
(d) local remedies must have been exhausted. This 
means that the national must have sought and been 
unable to obtain relief  from the offending State 
through “ordinary means” (generally referred to as 
the exhaustion of  local remedies requirement)74.
(e) the continuous nationality requirement must be 
complied with, which means that victim must have 
been a national of  the complaining State both at 
the time the wrong was committed and when the 
complaint was lodged 75,and
(f) the victim cannot be a national of  both the 
offending State and the complaining State, that 
is, no dual nationality as regards the two involved 
states.76
This paper’s focus on “nationality” means exami-
nation of  the alleged “clean hands” requirement falls 
outside its scope.
Nationality is fundamental to Diplomatic Protection 
(as it is to Consular Assistance). If  the victim is a dual 
national and one of  those nationalities is of  the state 
against which Diplomatic Protection is claimed, then a 
classic view would be that the claim may not be sustai-
ned at international law. Whether this classic formula-
tion remains intact will be discussed more specifically in 
Part Four below.
The nationality issue arose in relation to the Iran – 
United States Claims Tribunal. The Tribunal was res-
72 The issue of  what is an “international wrong” is a question of  
the Primary Rules, that is to say, what acts justify the invocation of  
diplomatic protection and when (and on what basis) is state respon-
sibility engaged; this will be discussed below.
73 See DUGARD, John R. First Report on Diplomatic Protection. UN 
Doc. A/CN. 4/506, 7 Mar. 2000. supra, n. 3, para. 36. “[…] it is a 
widely accepted rule of  customary international law that States have 
the right to protect their nationals abroad.”
74 Interhandel Case, 1959 ICJ Reports 27; Elettronica Sicula S.p.N. 
Case (ELSI) 1989 ICJ Reports 42. This rule is the subject matter of  
the Special Rapporteur’s Second Report on Diplomatic Protection 
UN. Doc. A/CN/.4/514 (hereinafter “Second Report”).
75 See LEIGH, Guy I. F. Nationality and diplomatic protection. 
Int’l and Comp. L. Q, v. 20, n. 453, p. 456, 1971. at p. 456. cf. DUCH-
ESNE, Matthew S. The continuous-nationality-of-claims principle: 
its historical development and current relevance to investor-state in-
vestment disputes. Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev, v. 36, p. 783, 2004. in which 
the author disputes whether continuous nationality is, in fact, a rule.
76 BROWNLIE, Ian. Principles of  public international law. 6. ed. Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2003. supra, n. 11, p. 404-405.
ponsible for adjudicating claims by United States na-
tionals in regards to the lump – sum settlement paid by 
Iran, pursuant to the Algiers Declaration, in settlement 
of  claims arising from the Iranian Revolution. In adju-
dicating the claims, the tribunal was to apply “[…] appli-
cable principles of  international law, justice and equity”, 
among other considerations.77
An issue that arose with some frequency before the 
tribunals involved claims by dual United States – Iranian 
nationals. Iran took the position that individuals, who 
were Iranian citizens under Iranian law, could not bring 
claims against Iran before the tribunal, even if  they 
were also citizens of  the United States.78 Iran’s position 
was summarized as follows:
The International law pertaining to the exercise of  
diplomatic protection clearly prohibits claims by 
persons who possess the nationality of  both the 
claimant and respondent states.79
The United States took the position that as the Al-
giers Declaration defined “nationals” as “citizens”, all 
United States nationals, including dual nationals, could 
make claims before the tribunal.80
The tribunal accepted neither position.
The tribunal embarked on an international law 
analysis of  the issue of  dual nationals and reached a 
number of  relevant conclusions.
1. The Algiers declaration is a treaty and is 
to be interpreted in accordance with the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of  Treaties 
(VCLT).81
2. The terms of  the Algiers Declaration must 
be given their ordinary meaning in terms 
of  their context and in the light of  its aims 
and purposes.
77 LILLICH, Richard B.; BEDERMAN, David J. Jurisprudence of  
the foreign claims settlement commission: Iran claims. AJIL, v. 91, 
p. 436, 1997.
78 IRAN–United States claims tribunal: decision in Case A/18 
concerning the question of  jurisdiction over claims of  persons with 
dual nationality. Int’l Legal Materials, v. 23, p. 489, 1984. at p. 491.
79 IRAN–United States claims tribunal: decision in Case A/18 
concerning the question of  jurisdiction over claims of  persons with 
dual nationality. Int’l Legal Materials, v. 23, p. 489, 1984. at p. 493.
80 IRAN–United States claims tribunal: decision in Case A/18 
concerning the question of  jurisdiction over claims of  persons with 
dual nationality. Int’l Legal Materials, v. 23, p. 489, 1984. at p. 496.
81 IRAN–United States claims tribunal: decision in Case A/18 
concerning the question of  jurisdiction over claims of  persons with 












































































































































3. In so doing, Article 31 (c) of  the VCLT 
directs tribunals to take into account 
any “relevant rules of  international law 
applicable to the relations between the 
parties”.82
4. It recognized that the 1930 Hague 
Convention upheld the principle, in Art. 
4, that diplomatic protection could not be 
afforded in cases of  dual nationality where 
the individual was a national of  both state 
parties. The tribunal cautioned, however, 
that Art. 4 must be interpreted very 
cautiously because:
Not only is it more than 50 years old and found in 
a treaty to which only 20 States are parties, but great 
changes have occurred since then in the concept of  di-
plomatic protection, which concept has been expanded.
1. Even if  the “non-responsibility” doctrine 
still applies to diplomatic protection that 
is a matter between states. The tribunal 
distinguished itself  from such issues by 
observing that it dealt with rights of  
individuals.83
The tribunal, following an analysis of  recent juris-
prudence and legal literature concluded “[…] that the 
‘actually dominant theory’ […] is, at least before inter-
national tribunals, the effective nationality theory.”84 
The tribunal said:
This trend toward modification of  the Hague 
Convention rule of  non-responsibility by search 
for the dominant and effective nationality is 
scarcely surprising as it is consistent with the 
contemporaneous development of  international 
law to accord legal protection to individuals, even 
against the State of  which they are nationals.85
The tribunal then concluded that:
Thus, the relevant rule of  international law which 
the Tribunal may take into account for purposes of  
interpretation, as directed by Article 31, paragraph 3 
82 IRAN–United States claims tribunal: decision in Case A/18 
concerning the question of  jurisdiction over claims of  persons with 
dual nationality. Int’l Legal Materials, v. 23, p. 489, 1984. at p. 497.
83 IRAN–United States claims tribunal: decision in Case A/18 
concerning the question of  jurisdiction over claims of  persons with 
dual nationality. Int’l Legal Materials, v. 23, p. 489, 1984. at p. 498.
84 IRAN–United States claims tribunal: decision in Case A/18 
concerning the question of  jurisdiction over claims of  persons with 
dual nationality. Int’l Legal Materials, v. 23, p. 489, 1984. at p. 500.
85 IRAN–United States claims tribunal: decision in Case A/18 
concerning the question of  jurisdiction over claims of  persons with 
dual nationality. Int’l Legal Materials, v. 23, p. 489, 1984. at p. 501.
(c) , of  the Vienna Convention is the rule that flows 
from the dictum of  Nottebohm, the rule of  real and 
effective nationality, and the search for “stronger 
factual ties between the person concerned and one 
of  the States whose nationality is involved”.86
Accordingly, the tribunal held that it had jurisdiction 
over claims against Iran by dual United States-Iranian 
nationals whose effective nationality during the relevant 
period was that of  the United States.87
The significance of  this decision is the assertion of  
the existence of  an objective test of  nationality for in-
ternational law purposes. Feeley writes:
In adopting the Nottebohm doctrine, the tribunal 
upheld an objective test of  nationality while 
considering the internal laws of  the United States 
and Iran. The tribunal acknowledged the validity 
of  both parties’ domestic laws but simultaneously 
refused to rely exclusively on such internal rules 
when determining the nationality of  the claimant 
before the tribunal. The tribunal thereby advanced 
the individual rights of  the claimant vis-à-vis the 
state without expressly infringing state sovereignty.88
As international tribunals have been consistent in 
their application of  the effective nationality test,89 the 
question arises whether this may be applied to dual na-
tionality situations under the VCCR will be discussed 
below.
Muchmore points out that it would be “[…] incon-
sistent with international nationality law to apply the law 
of  binding state action to the country of  non-dominant 
nationality if  the internal laws of  that country do not 
recognize dual nationality.”90 The issue, however, is not 
the application of  the internal law to individuals such as 
Mrs. Kazemi, and Mr. Celil and others. Even if  the mu-
nicipal courts have jurisdiction over them, for domestic 
purposes, this does not change the international posi-
tion which would regard their nationality for internatio-
86 IRAN–United States claims tribunal: decision in Case A/18 
concerning the question of  jurisdiction over claims of  persons with 
dual nationality. Int’l Legal Materials, v. 23, p. 489, 1984.
87 IRAN–United States claims tribunal: decision in Case A/18 
concerning the question of  jurisdiction over claims of  persons with 
dual nationality. Int’l Legal Materials, v. 23, p. 489, 1984.
88 SCOTT, Michael. Iran–United States Claims Tribunal: decision 
in Case A/18 concerning the question of  jurisdiction over claims 
of  persons with dual nationality. Harv. Int’l L.J., v. 26, p. 208, 1985. 
at p. 216.
89 MUCHMORE, Adam I. Passports and nationality in interna-
tional law. U.C. Davis J Int’l. L. and Pol’y, v. 301, p. 316, 2003/2004. 
supra note 31 at p. 314.
90 MUCHMORE, Adam I. Passports and nationality in interna-












































































































































nal law purposes, as being the dominant and effective 
nationality.
4   Consular assistance under the 
new challenges on the concept of 
nationality
Normally, individuals who find themselves outside 
their home countries may avail themselves of  consular 
assistance. Consular assistance is provided for under the 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR)91 
and includes, among other things, the right of  states, 
through consular officials to extend certain services to 
any of  their nationals in need.
Among the services contemplated by the VCCR are 
those relating to assistance to be provided to nationals 
of  the “sending State” who may have been arrested or 
find themselves in legal difficulty with officials of  the 
“receiving State”.
Article 36 of  the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations 196392 includes the following provisions:
Article 36
1) With a view to facilitating the exercise of  
consular functions relating to nationals of  the 
sending State:
a) Consular officials shall be free to communicate 
with nationals of  the sending State and to have 
access to them […]
b) […]
c) Consular officials shall have the right to visit 
a national of  the sending State who is in prison, 
custody or detention, to converse and correspond 
with him and to arrange for his legal representation. 
They shall also have the right to visit any national 
of  the sending State who is in prison, custody 
or detention in their district in pursuance of  a 
judgment […]
2) The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of  this 
article shall be exercised in conformity with the laws 
and regulations of  the receiving State, subject to the 
proviso, however, that the said laws and regulations 
must enable full effect to be given to the purposes 
for which the rights accorded under this article are 
intended.
91 UNITED NATIONS. Treaty Series, v. 596, p. 261, hereinafter 
referred to as VCCR.
92 UNITED NATIONS. Treaty Series, v. 596, p. 261, hereinafter 
referred to as VCCR.
The Article provides very limited, but clear and 
unambiguous, rights. Yet situations have arisen in 
which parties to the convention are refusing to grant 
even limited Article 36 rights to consular representa-
tives seeking to monitor judicial proceedings of  their 
nationals abroad. The situations tend to arise in cases 
in which an accused dual national faces legal difficulty 
in the state of  his birth nationality, and the state of  his 
nationalization seeks to provide him/her with consular 
assistance. This problem also exists in the context of  
Diplomatic Protection when a state seeks to “protect” 
one of  its nationals against a state of  which the victim 
is also a national.
This problem arises because there are states that 
do not recognize adopted nationalities of  persons they 
consider their own nationals; indeed, as noted earlier 
a majority of  states do not recognize dual nationality. 
Yet we live in a time of  increasing globalization and mi-
gration of  people. It is not difficult to imagine that, as 
more people adopt dual nationalities, problems arising 
from non-recognition of  second nationalities may be-
come more frequent.
Regarding the cases noted in the Introduction, both 
Iran and China are parties to the VCCR93. The VCCR 
is considered a codification of  customary international 
law; further, those matters not expressly addressed by 
the VCCR continue to be governed by customary inter-
national law.94 Iran, but not China, is also a party to the 
Optional Protocol to the VCCR Concerning the Com-
pulsory Settlement of  Disputes, having acceded on 5 
June 1975.95
As stated, a state´s application of  its own definition 
of  nationality may be inadequate for international law 
purposes. Accordingly, the failure of  Iran and China 
to recognize, domestically, the adopted nationalities of  
Mrs. Kazemi and Mr. Celil may have violated their inter-
national law obligations.96 Further, and specifically as to 
93 Iran ratified the VCCR on 5 June 2975; China acceded to the 
VCCR on 2 July 1979. See: Multilateral treaties Deposited With the 
Secretary-General. Disponível em: http://treaties.un.org/Pages/
ParticipationStatus.aspx. Acesso em: 26 nov. 2013.
94 VCCR supra, note 2, opening averments.
95 Multilateral treaties Deposited With the Secretary-General, su-
pra note 54 at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/getter.asp. Canada is 
not a party and the United States has withdrawn from it.
96 The problem does not arise when the dual national is detained 
in a country in which he/she is not a national. The recent case of  
Luis Carlos Cossio is an example. Cossio was detained by Venezuela 












































































































































China, though they have acknowledged Mr. Kovrig and 
Mr. Spavor as Canadian nationals, the limitations placed 
upon them in the exercise of  their consular assistan-
ce raises questions as to whether China has violated its 
VCCR obligations.97
Based upon the discussion above as to the evolving 
international treatment of  “nationality” it is argued 
here that the domestic position regarding nationality 
ought to have no bearing on the issue as to whether 
dual nationals are entitled to receive consular assistance. 
The VCCR is an international convention, embodying 
customary international law. If  Nottebohm means 
anything, it stands for the proposition that internatio-
nal law is not bound by domestic rules as to nationality. 
Does the dominant nationality test apply to the issue of  
nationality under the VCCR? Arguably yes, based upon 
six considerations:
1. The trend of  international tribunals to apply 
the dominant and effective nationality test.
2. Even if  the majority of  the cases involving 
the issue have been in the context of  
diplomatic protection, the Iran – United 
States Claims Tribunal decision made 
it clear that the “doctrine of  non-
responsibility” has more than likely been 
overtaken by time,
3. Even if  the “doctrine of  non-responsibility” 
has survived, it seems to be on its last legs. 
The Iran – United States Claims Tribunal 
took the view that if  it survives, it is in 
the area of  diplomatic protection. When 
the claim of  an individual against a State 
is at issue, the “dominant and effective 
nationality” test should be applied.
4. In this context, the issue arises whether 
the right to consular assistance is a right 
of  a State or the right of  an individual. As 
noted above, the definition of  “consular 
functions” is defined to include protecting 
the interests of  ”[…] the sending state and 
Colombia-Canadian national and, accordingly, Canada has sought 
to provide consular assistance on his behalf. To date there is no 
indication that Venezuela has denied access. See: El Universal, 9 Apr. 
2010. online edition. Disponível em: http://calidaddevida.eluniver-
sal.com/2010/04/09/pol_ava_canada-solicita-visi_09A3718813.
shtml. Acesso em: 27 nov. 2013.
97 And, of  course, the Diplomatic Immunity issue as regards Mr. 
Kovrig is yet another matter in which questions of  Chinese compli-
ance with international legal obligations have arisen.
of  its nationals […]”98 (emphasis added). 
This inclusive language would seem to 
mean that not only the state but the 
individual nationals have interests. In such 
circumstances, particularly if  a Section 31 
and 32 of  the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of  Treaties analysis is applied (as it 
was by the tribunal), any ambiguity in the 
language would have to be resolved in 
favour of  recognizing the “dominant and 
effective nationality test”.
5. The same analysis ought to apply in 
interpreting the Canada – China Consular 
agreement which includes as a consular 
functions the “protecting and securing of  
the rights and interests of  the sending state 
and its nationals”.99
6. As noted, international law has been 
expanding its recognition of  the rights of  
individuals’ vis-à-vis states. Indeed, this 
was one reason that the Tribunal gave for 
deciding upon the dominant and effective 
nationality test. Other scholars, as noted, 
have been propounding the view that the 
right to a dual nationality is a right.
Even if  there is no right to have a dual nationali-
ty, however, it appears clear that is open to internatio-
nal law to interpret “national” for the purpose of  the 
VCCR as the dominant and effective nationality of  the 
individual in question. That, in the end, becomes a ques-
tion of  fact. The tribunal would have to examine the 
life and situation of  the individual in question to assess 
with which state such an individual had the closest links. 
Tests are suggested in Nottebohm and in a number of  
the individual cases before the Iran-United States Clai-
ms tribunal, but that is the subject for another paper.
5 Analysis and context
5.1 Context and examples
It would be inaccurate to assert that the issue of  dual 
or multiple nationalities is a new problem engendered 
by globalization and increasing mobility of  peoples. It 
98 Supra, note 6.












































































































































is fair to say, however, that the modern approach to the 
issue of  nationality comes as a reaction to modern atti-
tudes towards personal mobility.
In today’s world of  mobile populations, instanta-
neous communication, globalization in terms of  tra-
de and commerce and the evolution of  transnational 
methods of  dispute resolution not only for states, but 
for individuals, it is becoming common to refer to the 
“Global Village”. But while it may be pleasant to envi-
sion ourselves as “citizens of  the world”100 we cannot 
escape the fact that concepts of  nationality which evol-
ved in the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries still provide the 
basis upon an individual’s place in the world is establi-
shed, and these concepts may, from time to time, create 
unwelcome surprises.
Though there may be no “right” per se to have a 
dual nationality it appears clear from the foregoing that 
is open to international law to interpret “national” for 
the purpose of  Diplomatic Protection and the VCCR as 
the dominant and effective nationality of  the individual 
in question.
The Zaghari-Ratcliffe case noted above illustrates 
this point. Ms. Zaghari Ratcliffe is a dual Iranian-UK 
national. The UK has taken the view that the denial 
of  necessary medical care and medicine as well as the 
denial of  access to her own doctor is the “internatio-
nal wrong” supporting the claim for Diplomatic Pro-
tection.101 But Iran does not recognize dual nationality. 
Thus, Iran does not recognize her UK nationality. Iran 
says she has been treated as any other Iranian national 
and that the UK claim for Diplomatic Protection viola-
tes international law.102
While the Iranian position reflects the classical view 
of  the applicability of  Diplomatic protection, the evo-
lution towards an effective or dominant nationality test 
for international law purposes could open the door 
for a different result in this case. It is the position of  
the authors that this would be a progressive develop-
ment of  international law that ought to be encouraged. 
Specifically, as is clear from cases such as Nottebohm, 
international law is clear that, for municipal purposes, 
100 See for example a discussion on the possibility of  extending 
nationality beyond the nation state in BOSNIAL, Linda. Citizenship 





states may determine nationality. They decide who to 
recognize, and who not to recognize, as nationals for 
their own sovereign purposes. But on the international 
plane, and for purposes of  international law, there is 
no obligation to accept municipal definitions of  natio-
nality. Indeed, international law has been clear that it 
will determine for itself  what nationality is for purposes 
of  international law, and that the “effective nationality” 
standard is the measure it will apply. This would entail 
no infringement on any state’s sovereign right to deter-
mine, for its own purposes, who is or is not a national 
of  that state. It would only prevent its imposition of  
that definition upon the international plane, an approa-
ch clearly applied in the famous Nottebohm case. This 
view is further enhanced by the views cited above in the 
Iran – United Status Claims Tribunal which acknowled-
ged the expansion of  the remedy of  Diplomatic Pro-
tection in the years since the 1930 Hague Convention 
came into being.103
The following cases illustrate the need for the su-
ggested evolution in recognition of  nationality to be 
adopted:
5.1.1 Zahra Kazemi
Ms. Kazemi was an Iranian-born naturalized Ca-
nadian citizen who, at the age of  54 years, died while 
in custody in Iran. She was a photojournalist and had 
traveled to Iran in Spring 2003 to cover student riots 
happening at the time. She was arrested by Iranian au-
thorities on 23 June 2003 for taking photos outside a 
prison in Teheran. She died on 11 July 2003.104 Iranian 
Vice President Mohammad Ali Abhati acknowledged 
on 16 July 2003 that, despite earlier representations by 
the Iranian authorities that she had suffered a stroke, 
she had in fact died from being beaten.105
After her death, Canadian authorities, in support 
of  her son’s request, sought unsuccessfully the return 
of  her body to Canada for burial and so that a proper 
forensic investigation could be conducted. The Special 
103 Supra, note 59.
104 For a full description of  the facts of  Ms. Karemi’s death please 
refer to the decision of  the Quebec Court of  Appeal in Islamic Re-
public of  Iran v. Hashemi 12 August 2012 2012 QCCA 1449, p 3-5.
105 LIGABO, Ambeyi. Special Rapporteur. U.N. High Commission 
on Human Rights on the Right to Freedom of  Opinion and Expres-
sion. Report on Mission to the Islamic Republic of  Iran. 12 Jan. 2004. U.N. 












































































































































Rapporteur for Freedom of  Expression appointed by 
the United Nations Commission of  Human Rights, 
Ambeyi Ligabo, traveled to Iran in 2003 to consult with 
Iranian authorities about a number of  complaints that 
had been received about the situation there. In his re-
port to the Commission he wrote:
[…] the Special Rapporteur appeals to the 
authorities to allow Mrs. Kazemi to be buried in 
Canada, in accordance with the express wish of  
Mrs. Kazemi’s son, Stephen Hachemi, and her 
mother, Ezzat Kazemi.106
Iran denied these requests. Throughout, Iran did not 
to recognize Ms. Kazemi’s Canadian nationality and refu-
sed to allow Canadian involvement in any investigations, 
or judicial proceedings. Family members of  Ms Kazemi 
living in the Canadian province of  Quebec sought to sue 
the Iranian government for damages caused by her tortu-
re-death. The case was begun in the Quebec Courts, but 
without success for the Plaintiffs. The final appeal to the 
Supreme Court of  Canada was also rejected. The Court, 
though clearly sympathetic to the family, determined that 
the State Immunity Act107 shielded Iran from liability. 
Thus state sovereignty ultimately applied to shield the 
Iranian state from the consequences of  its acts.108
Iranian law does not recognize dual nationality. The 
United States Office of  Personnel Management Inves-
tigations Service reports that involuntary denationaliza-
tion is virtually impossible. Even voluntary denationa-
lization, which requires the rarely granted consent of  
the Council of  Ministers, is almost completely unavaila-
ble.109 Thus if  a person is born Iranian, or even if  their 
father was born Iranian, he or she may unexpectedly 
find themselves regarded by Iran as falling under Ira-
nian legal jurisdiction. In such circumstances, the effec-
tive nationality definition should apply.
5.1.2 Huseyincan Celil
Mr. Celil is another naturalized Canadian citizen, but 
born with Chinese nationality. Ethnically, he is a Uighur 
106 LIGABO, Ambeyi. Special Rapporteur. U.N. High Commission 
on Human Rights on the Right to Freedom of  Opinion and Expres-
sion. Report on Mission to the Islamic Republic of  Iran. 12 Jan. 2004. U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/62/Add 2, para. 74. at para 80.
107 R.S.C., 1985, c. S-18.
108 The result today could well be different since now Iran is one 
of  only two states whose immunity has been lifted for the purposes 
of  the Justice for Victims of  Terrorism Act.
109 Supra note 15 at p. 97.
a largely Muslim minority group. He was born and rai-
sed in China but came to Canada with his wife in 2000 
as a refugee. Sometime after that he received his Cana-
dian citizenship.110
Some Chinese Uighurs have been agitating within 
China for greater autonomy. It appears that Mr. Celil 
was active in this movement. Chinese authorities have 
accused these groups of  terrorism, with the result that 
Mr. Celil was sought for prosecution.
According to reports, Mr. Celil was in Uzbekistan in 
March 2006 visiting relatives of  his wife. He was arres-
ted by Uzbek authorities, and Canadian officials were 
made aware of  the arrest. Canada sought his return to 
Canada, but Uzbekistan, instead, extradited him to Chi-
na where he was put on trial for terrorist related charges.
Chinese nationality law does not recognize dual na-
tionality111; further, as regards Chinese nationals adop-
ting another nationality, Article 9 of  the Nationality 
Law of  the People’s Republic of  China provides that:
Any Chinese national who has settled abroad and 
who has been naturalized as a foreign national or 
has acquired foreign nationality of  his own free will 
shall automatically lose Chinese nationality.112
Canadian diplomats in China have repeatedly at-
tempted to meet with Mr. Celil, to attend his judicial 
hearings and provide other forms of  consular assis-
tance. Despite the foregoing provisions, however, all 
attempts to provide consular assistance have been de-
nied by Chinese authorities on the basis that they do 
not recognize his Canadian citizenship. Thus, from the 
Chinese viewpoint, the case is not subject to consular 
agreements. The position they take is that, as a dual citi-
zen, he is subject to Chinese laws.113
Mr. Celil was convicted in April 2007 of  “splitism” 
and terrorist related charges. Throughout the procee-
110 http://us.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/americas/07/10/canada.
detainee.ap/index.html. (DEAD LINK).
111 Nationality Law of  the People’s Republic of  China. Disponível 
em: http://www.china.org.cn/english/LivinginChina/184710.htm. 
Acesso em: 28 nov. 2013. Article 3.
112 Nationality Law of  the People’s Republic of  China. Disponível 
em: http://www.china.org.cn/english/LivinginChina/184710.htm. 
Acesso em: 28 nov. 2013. Article 9.
113 FAMILY seeks whereabouts of  jailed chinese-canadian activ-
ist. CBC Canada, 28 Mar. 2008. Disponível em: http://www.cbc.ca/
news/canada/family-seeks-whereabouts-of-jailed-chinese-canadi-
an-activist-1.762192. Acesso em: 26 nov. 2013. The article points 













































































































































ding no Canadian diplomat was permitted to attend. Mr. 
Celil’s whereabouts are a mystery. He has been moved 
to a new prison, and Chinese officials refuse to disclose 
where he is. According to Mr. Celil’s Canadian lawyer, 
Chris MacLeod, the request for information about his 
new locations was denied on the basis that Mr. Celil was 
a Chinese citizen and no one has standing to make en-
quiries.114
Amnesty International (Canada) wrote a letter to 
then Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper on the 
matter requesting further Canadian government efforts 
on Mr. Celil’s behalf.115 In addition, the United States 
House of  Representatives passed a “sense of  the House 
“resolution which said that China “[…] should imme-
diately release Canadian citizen Huseyin Celil (sic) and 
allow him to rejoin his family in Canada”.116
China’s non-recognition of  Mr. Celil’s Canadian na-
tionality is disturbing for a number of  reasons. First, he 
was not in China at the time of  his apprehension; he 
was in Uzbekistan; Uzbek authorities extradited him to 
China rather than returning him to Canada as requested 
by the Canadian government. Secondly, in addition to 
the VCCR, to which both Canada and China are par-
ties, there is a Consular Agreement between Canada and 
China relating to the provision of  consular services to 
nationals of  each country.117 There is no mention wi-
thin that document that China does not recognize dual 
nationality nor does it exclude dual nationals from the 
definition of  those entitles to consular services. Thus, 
China’s treatment of  Mr. Celil, or at least its disregard 
of  Canada’s desire to offer consular services, is so-
mewhat more surprising than the Iranian position.118 
Nevertheless, China’s position was stated by Foreign 
114 “Canada angry at Uighur sentence” TheSpec.com - Local - 
China remains silent on Burlington man’s welfare. BBC News, 20 
Apr. 2007. Disponível em: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacif-
ic/6574517.stm. Acesso em: 26 nov. 2013.
115 Amnesty International letter to P.M. Stephen Harper dated 28 
Mar. 2008. copy on file with the author.
116 H.Res 497 Passed. 17 Sept. 2007. Disponível em: https://www.
govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/hres497/text. Acesso em: 26 nov. 
2013.
117 CONSULAR Agreement Between the Government of  Canada 
and the Government of  the People’s Republic of  China. Disponível 
em: http://travel.gc.ca/about/assistance/consular/framework/
china. Acesso em: 26 nov. 2013.
118 It is to be noted in this regard that Canada’s relations with Iran 
have been tense since 1979 when, during the occupation of  the 
United States Embassy in Teheran by Iranian students, Canadian 
diplomats succeeded in helping a number of  their United States col-
leagues escape from Iran disguised as Canadians.
Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao: “The case of  Hu-
seyincan Celil is an internal affair, and Canada has no 
right to interfere.”119
5.1.3 Haleh Esfandiari
Another example is that of  Haleh Esfandiari who in 
2006 was an Iranian-American, Director of  the Middle 
East Programme of  the Woodrow Wilson Internatio-
nal Institute for Scholars120 which was described in the 
Washington Post as one of  Washington’s “most promi-
nent” foreign policy think tanks.121 Her sudden arrest in 
Teheran while returning from a visit to her mother led 
to her being in Iranian custody until September 2008 
on suspicion of  “security crimes”.122 She was originally 
kept under house arrest but on 9 May 2007 she was 
formally arrested and sent to Evin Prison (where Zahra 
Karemi received her fatal beating) on suspicion of  “se-
curity crimes”. In a statement released after her return 
to the United States, she indicated that although her jai-
lers were polite, she was kept in solitary confinement 
for 105 days, and denied visitors or contact with legal 
counsel.123
5.1.4 Others
There are approximately 200 Canadian citizens and 
other westerners under arrest or detention in China in-
cluding:
• Sun Qian a Chinese-born Canadian arrested 
in Beijing in 2017.124
119 CANADA angry at Uighur sentence. BBC.com, 20 Apr. 2007. 
Disponível em: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6574517.
stm. Acesso em: 10 abr. 2019.
120 See: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/statement-the-ar-
rest-tehran-haleh-esfandiari-director-the-woodrow-wilson-centers-
middle-east. Acesso em: 26 nov. 2013.
121 See: TEHRAN jails iranian american scholar after long house 
arrest. Washington Post, 9 May 2007. Disponível em: http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/08/
AR2007050801276.html?nav=hcmodule. Acesso em: 26 nov. 2013.
122 AFTER months of  uncertainty and imprisonment Dr. Haleh 
Esfandiari returns home. Wilson Centre. Disponível em: http://www.
wilsoncenter.org/article/after-months-uncertainty-and-imprison-
ment-dr-haleh-esfandiari-returns-home-0. Acesso em: 26 nov. 2013.
1 2 3 h t t p : / / w w w. w i l s o n c e n t e r . o r g / i n d e x . c f m ? t o p i c _
id=1426&fuseaction=topics.item&news_id=285716 
124 GRAUER, Perrin; CHIU, Joanna. The ‘forgotten’ Canadians 














































































































































• John Chang, a Taiwan-born winery owner 
from Richmond BC being held on tax-
related charges.125
• Xian Jianhua, a Chinese-born Canadian 
billionaire reportedly taken from a Hong 
Kong hotel by wheelchair and removed to 
China.126
• Yang Henjun, an Australian novelist and 
former diplomat who was taken into custody 
but whose whereabouts are unknown.127
These are just China, and do not include Iranian held 
prisoners. The common element in all of  these cases, 
and other similar ones128, is that the state of  birth has 
not recognized the adopted nationality of  the subject. 
As noted above China, on paper, has a mechanism for 
the recognition of  dual nationality and it is unclear why, 
in the case of  Mr. Celil, it did not recognize his adop-
ted Canadian nationality. More troubling, of  course, is 
the fact that Mr. Celil was not in China at the time of  
his apprehension. He was in Uzbekistan and there is a 
valid question as to why he was extradited to China and 
not to Canada. Thus, each of  them had adopted a new 
nationality or nationalities, each had ended up (one way 
or another) in the state of  their birth, each had run into 
legal difficulties with the authorities and in each case 
the state of  new nationality was unable to assist their 
citizens as a result of  the non-recognition by the birth 
state of  the new nationality.
Nonetheless, it is abundantly clear that, despite the 
clear provisions of  the VCCR, the application of  these 
provisions may place certain people’s liberty in doubt. 
125 GRAUER, Perrin; CHIU, Joanna. The ‘forgotten’ Canadians 
detained in China. The Toronto Star, 20 Dec. 2018. Disponível em: 
https://www.thestar.com/vancouver/2018/12/20/the-forgotten-
canadians-detained-in-china.html.
126 GRAUER, Perrin; CHIU, Joanna. The ‘forgotten’ Canadians 
detained in China. The Toronto Star, 20 Dec. 2018. Disponível em: 
https://www.thestar.com/vancouver/2018/12/20/the-forgotten-
canadians-detained-in-china.html.
127 CANADIANS and Chinese justice: a who’s who of  the politi-
cal feud so far. The Globe and Mail, Toronto, 15 Jan. 2019. Disponível 
em: https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-canadians-
detained-china-huawei-explainer/.
128 According to the Toronto Star there are at least 200 Canadians 
held in Chinese custody. See: MACCHARLES, Tonda. ‘Hundreds’ 
of  Canadians held by China raises the stakes for Trudeau’s govern-
ment. The Toronto Star, 20 Dec. 2019. Disponível em: https://www.
thestar.com/politics/federal/2018/12/20/hundreds-of-canadians-
held-by-china-raise-stakes-for-trudeau-government.html.
The question to be asked is whether International Law 
possesses a means for the resolution of  this ambiguity.
5.2  Analysis: the continuing impact of effective 
nationality in international dispute 
settlement
As parties to the VCCR129, which is also conside-
red a codification of  customary international law, both 
China and Iran are bound to allow consular assistance 
to nationals of  other states. Indeed, those matters not 
expressly addressed by the VCCR continue to be go-
verned by customary international law.130 Iran, though 
not China, is also a party to the Optional Protocol to 
the VCCR Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of  
Disputes, having acceded on 5 June 1975.131 Diplomatic 
Protection is also a part of  the body of  international 
customary law, and so China and Iran are bound by that 
as well.
As is clear, the application by a state of  its own defi-
nition of  nationality may be inadequate for international 
law purposes. While it is clear that states may adopt, for 
national purposes, their own definitions of  “nationality”, 
it is also clear that international law reserves to itself  the 
equivalent competence to determine how it will determi-
ne and define “nationality” for international law purpo-
ses. While a state has the sovereign right to apply its own 
definitions of  nationality for municipal purposes, it must 
be obliged to apply the international law definition when 
it operates on the international plane.
For international law purposes, “nationality” is in-
creasingly assessed upon an “effective nationality” ba-
sis. Once the effective nationality of  the individual is 
determined, which would be a question of  fact and not 
of  law, then that individual’s rights from an internatio-
nal law perspective can be determined and, if  necessary, 
remedies applied.
So in the cases noted above, if  “nationality” means 
“effective nationality” at an international law level, then a 
strong argument exists that by the failure of  Iran and Chi-
129 Iran ratified the VCCR on 5 June 2975; China acceded to the 
VCCR on 2 July 1979. See: Multilateral treaties deposited with the 
Secretary-General. Disponível em: http://treaties.un.org/Pages/
ParticipationStatus.aspx. Acesso em: 26 nov. 2013.
130 VCCR supra, note 2, opening averments.
131 “Multilateral treaties Deposited With the Secretary-General”, 
supra note 54 at: http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/getter.asp. Cana-












































































































































na to recognize, domestically, the adopted nationalities of  
Ms. Kazemi, Mr. Celil, Ms Zaghari-Ratcliffe and others 
they may have violated their international law obligations.132 
Put another way, if  effective nationality is the standard for 
nationality-based remedies under international law, then 
mistreatment of  dual nationals may create openings for the 
assertion of  claims under the rubric of  Diplomatic Protec-
tion. Further, if  China has effectively denied consular assis-
tance to Mr. Kovrig and Mr. Spavor, for example, this may 
have violated another nationality based right at international 
law. Any claim arising from such a violation should not fail 
on the mere basis of  the dual nationality of  the victim.
Within that legal context, international law should 
apply this standard in cases of  dual nationality when 
Diplomatic Protection is claimed as a remedy and when 
consular assistance is sought. Ultimately this becomes a 
question of  fact. A tribunal would have to examine the 
life and situation of  the individual in question to assess 
with which state such an individual had the closest links. 
Tests are suggested in Nottebohm and in a number of  
the individual cases before the Iran-United States Clai-
ms tribunal, but that is the subject for another paper.
6 Conclusions and recommendations
When individuals adopt a new nationality the vast 
majority of  them, with the chance of  a new beginning 
in a new land, undoubtedly do so with a sense of  opti-
mism and hope. It is likely that, once they have a new 
nationality, they expect to have the rights and protec-
tions of  their fellow citizens. Yet through no fault of  
theirs or of  their new nation’s this may not be the case. 
If  a person has left a country which neither recognizes 
dual nationality nor permits divestment of  the birth na-
tionality, their new nationality may not be recognized. 
Thus a return visit to the land of  their birth, or to states 
with close connections with the land of  their birth, may 
pose hazards. As Mr. Celil discovered, neither his Cana-
132 The problem does not arise when the dual national is detained 
in a country in which he/she is not a national. The recent case of  
Luis Carlos Cossio is an example. Cossio was detained by Venezuela 
in April 2010 in relation to suspicion of  espionage. Cossio is a dual 
Colombia-Canadian national and, accordingly, Canada has sought to 
provide consular assistance on his behalf. To date there is no indica-
tion that Venezuela has denied access. See: El Universal, 9 Apr. 2010. 
Disponível em: http://calidaddevida.eluniversal.com/2010/04/09/
pol_ava_canada-solicita-visi_09A3718813.shtml. Acesso em: 27 
nov. 2013.
dian nationality nor his presence in Uzbekistan, did not 
prevent his ending in a Chinese prison.
Individuals who take dual nationality should take the 
following precautions:
(i) ensure that you develop strong connections 
with the new state of  nationality. Open bank 
accounts, buy a house, maintain steady employment 
and pay taxes; all of  these things will assist in 
establishing that your dominant and effective 
nationality is the newly adopted one.
(ii) Be aware of  the legal status of  your new 
nationality vis-à-vis your original nation. Does 
it recognize dual nationality? If  not will it allow 
consular assistance to be provided by the state of  
new nationality if  necessary? You can find this out 
at your Ministry of  Foreign Relations, or equivalent.
(iii) If  your birth state does not recognize dual 
nationality and you do travel to your former homeland, 
register immediately with your embassy. Make sure 
they have a detailed itinerary of  your trip, including 
contact information (phone numbers, emails etc). In 
the event of  a problem you need to be sure that the 
embassy can find you or a contact person.
States, such as Canada, the United States, Austra-
lia and others, who accept many immigrants and have 
many dual nationals arguably have an onus to carefully 
advise their new citizens of  the risks some of  them may 
face in traveling to their former homelands, and the 
limitations on the ability of  their new government to 
assist.133
More delicate is the issue of  the steps, which ought 
to be taken at the international level to clarify such is-
sues. While states generally resist perceived interference 
in their internal affairs, it is clear that there is an interna-
tional component to “nationality”. States receiving large 
numbers of  immigrants must decide if  they are going 
to permit some countries to ignore their international 
obligations in this field to the detriment of  their na-
tionalized citizens. Craig Forcese, of  the University of  
Ottawa has written that, within the Canadian context, 
the Canadian government should be subject to a legal 
obligation to assert diplomatic protection in all cases in 
which states refuse to acknowledge the dual nationality 
of  a Canadian citizen.134 Logically, the same should ap-
ply to consular assistance.
133 The Australian Government, for example, provides informa-
tion to dual nationals via the Internet. See: http://www.smartravel-
ler.gov.au/tips/dualnat.html#whats.
134 FORCESE, Craig. The obligation to protect: the legal context 
for diplomatic protection of  canadians abroad. University of  New 












































































































































Such steps, though possibly including actions at the 
International Court of  Justice, could include interven-
tions at the International Law Commission and in other 
international human rights tribunals.
Once granted nationality, new citizens have a reaso-
nable expectation that they are on the same legal plane 
as their fellow citizens. If  grants of  citizenship are to 
be derogated from by the actions of  other states and if  
those actions arguably are in violation of  international 
law, then arguably the nationalizing state has a duty to 
take all steps necessary to clarify the issue for interna-
tional law purposes as well as to defend the meaning of  
their own nationality. It is a duty they owe themselves 
because there is a need to uphold international treaties 
and to prevent anarchy. It would also seem to be a duty 
owed to their newest citizens.
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